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Abstract
Recent success of Bayesian methods in neuro-
science and artificial intelligence gives rise to the
hypothesis that the brain is a Bayesian machine.
Since logic, as the laws of thought, is a product
and practice of the human brain, it leads to an-
other hypothesis that there is a Bayesian algorithm
and data-structure for logical reasoning. In this
paper, we give a Bayesian account of entailment
and characterize its abstract inferential properties.
The Bayesian entailment is shown to be a mono-
tonic consequence relation in an extreme case. In
general, it is a sort of non-monotonic consequence
relation without Cautious monotony or Cut. The
preferential entailment, which is a representative
non-monotonic consequence relation, is shown to
be maximum a posteriori entailment, which is an
approximation of the Bayesian entailment. We fi-
nally discuss merits of our proposals in terms of
encoding preferences on defaults, handling change
and contradiction, and modeling human entailment.
1 Introduction
Bayes’ Theorem plays an important role in various fields
such as artificial intelligence, neuroscience, cognitive sci-
ence, statistical physics and bioinformatics. It lays the foun-
dation of most modern systems in artificial intelligence [Rus-
sell and Norvig, 2009]. Recent studies of neuroscience em-
pirically show that Bayesian methods explain several func-
tions of the cerebral cortex [Lee and Mumford, 2003; Knill
and Pouget, 2004; George and Hawkins, 2005; Colombo and
Serie`s, 2012; Funamizu et al., 2016]. It is the outer por-
tion of the brain in charge of higher-order functions such
as perception, memory, emotion and thought. These suc-
cesses of Bayesian methods give rise to the Bayesian brain
hypothesis that brain is a Bayesian machine [Friston, 2012;
Sanborn and Chater, 2016].
If the Bayesian brain hypothesis is true then it is natural
to think that there is a Bayesian algorithm and data-structure
for logical reasoning. This is because logic, as the laws of
thought, is a product and practice of the human brain. Pur-
suing a Bayesian account of logical reasoning is important.
First, it has a potential to be a mathematical model to explain
how the human brain implements logical reasoning. Second,
it supports the Bayesian brain hypothesis in an analytical way
in terms of logic. Third. it gives a way to critically assess the
existing formalisms of logical reasoning. Nevertheless, few
research has focused on reformulating logical reasoning in
terms of Bayesian perspectives (see Section 4 for discussion).
In this paper, we begin by assuming the posterior distri-
bution over valuation functions. The probability of each val-
uation function represents how much the state of the world
specified by the valuation function is natural, normal or typ-
ical. We then assume a causal relation from the valuation
function to each sentence. Let v and α denote a valuation
function and a sentence, respectively. Under the two assump-
tions, the probability that α is true, denoted by p(α), will be
shown to have
p(α) =
∑
v
p(α, v) =
∑
v
p(α|v)p(v).
That is, the probability of any sentence is determined by tak-
ing into account all valuation functions probabilistically dis-
tributed. Given a set ∆ of sentences with the same assump-
tions, we will show to have
p(α|∆) =
∑
v
p(α|v)p(v|∆).
This equation is known as Bayesian learning [Russell and
Norvig, 2009]. Intuitively speaking, ∆ updates the proba-
bility distribution over valuation functions, i.e., p(v) for all
v, and then the updated distribution is used to predict the
truth value of α. We define a Bayesian entailment, denoted
by ∆ p≈ω α, using p(α|∆) ≥ ω, as usual.
Several important facts are derived from the simple idea.
The Bayesian entailment is shown to be a monotonic conse-
quence relation when ω = 1. In general, it is a sort of non-
monotonic consequence relation without Cautious monotony
or Cut. The preferential entailment [Shoham, 1987], which
is a representative non-monotonic consequence relation, is
shown to be an approximation of the Bayesian entailment.
We derive it from the relationship between maximum a pos-
teriori estimation and Bayesian estimation. These results im-
ply that both monotonic and non-monotonic consequence re-
lations can be seen as Bayesian learning with a fixed proba-
bility threshold. We discuss that our proposals have advan-
tages of encoding preferences on defaults, handling change
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
00
96
1v
2 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 6 
M
ay
 20
20
and contradiction, and being a mathematical model of human
entailment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a prob-
abilistic model for a Bayesian entailment. Section 3 focuses
on its correctness. We analyze its inferential properties in
terms of monotonic and non-monotonic consequence rela-
tions. Section 4 concludes with discussion of related work.
2 Bayesian Entailment
Let L, P and v respectively denote the propositional lan-
guage, the set of all propositional symbols in L, and a valua-
tion function, v : P → {0, 1}, where 0 and 1 mean the truth
values, false and true, respectively. To handle uncertainty of
states of the world, we assume that valuation functions are
probabilistically distributed. Let V denote a random variable
over valuation functions. p(V = vi) denotes the probability
of valuation function vi. It reflects the probability of the state
of the world specified by vi. Given two valuation functions
v1 and v2, p(V = v1) > p(V = v2) represents that the state
of the world specified by v1 is more natural, typical or nor-
mal than that of v2. When the cardinality of P is n, there are
2n possible states of the world. Thus, there are 2n possible
valuation functions. It is the case that 0 ≤ p(vi) ≤ 1, for all i
such that 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n, and∑2ni=1 p(V = vi) = 1.
We assume that every propositional sentence is a random
variable that has a truth value either 0 or 1. For all α ∈ L,
p(α = 1) represents the probability that α is true and p(α =
0) that α is false. We assume that JαK denotes the set of all
valuation functions in which α is true and JαKv denotes the
truth value under valuation function v.
Definition 1 (Interpretation). Let α be a propositional sen-
tence and V be a valuation function. The conditional proba-
bility distribution over α given V is given as follows.
p(α = 1|V ) = JαKV
p(α = 0|V ) = 1− JαKV
As usual, we assume that the truth value is caused only by
the valuation functions. p(α) is thus given by
p(α) =
∑
vi
p(α, V = vi) =
∑
vi
p(α|V = vi)p(V = vi).
Example 1. Suppose two propositional symbols a and b.
Consider the following probability distribution over valua-
tion functions, where p(V = v) is abbreviated to p(v).
p(V ) = (p(v1), p(v2), p(v3), p(v4)) = (0.5, 0.2, 0, 0.3)
The left table in Table 1 shows all 22 = 4 valuation functions
and their probability distribution. The right table in Table 1
shows p(a ∨ ¬b|V ). p(a ∨ ¬b = 1) is derived as follows,
where JαKV=v is abbreviated to JαKv .
p(a ∨ ¬b = 1) =
4∑
i=1
p(a ∨ ¬b = 1|vi)p(vi)
=
4∑
i=1
Ja ∨ ¬bKvip(vi)
= p(v1) + p(v3) + p(v4) = 0.8
Table 1: The left table shows all valuation functions and their distri-
bution. The right table shows p(a ∨ ¬b|V ).
p(V ) a b
v1 0.5 0 0
v2 0.2 0 1
v3 0 1 0
v4 0.3 1 1
a ∨ ¬b = 0 a ∨ ¬b = 1
v1 0 1
v2 1 0
v3 0 1
v4 0 1
p(a ∨ ¬b = 0) = 0.2 is shown in the same way.
Definition 1 implies that the probability of the truth of a
sentence is not primitive. We thus guarantee that it satisfies
the Kolmogorov axioms.
Proposition 1. Let α, β ∈ L. The followings hold.
1. 0 ≤ p(α = i), for all i.
2.
∑
i p(α = i) = 1.
3. p(α ∨ β = i) = p(α = i) + p(β = i) − p(α ∧ β = i),
for all i.
Proof. Since any sentence takes a truth value either 0 or 1, it
is sufficient for (1) and (2) to show p(α = 0)+p(α = 1) = 1
and 0 ≤ p(α = 0), p(α = 1) ≤ 1. We have
p(α = 0) =
∑
v
p(α = 0|v)p(v) =
∑
v
(1− JαKv)p(v)
p(α = 1) =
∑
v
p(α = 1|v)p(v) =
∑
v
JαKvp(v)
(1) is true because 0 ≤ p(v) holds, for all v. (2) is true be-
cause p(α = 0) + p(α = 1) =
∑
v p(v) = 1 holds. Let X be{JαKv + JβKv − Jα ∧ βKv}. (3) can be developed as follows,
where the first expression comes when i = 0 and the second
when i = 1.∑
v
p(v)(1− Jα ∨ βKv) = ∑
v
p(v)(1−X)∑
v
p(v)Jα ∨ βKv = ∑
v
p(v)X
There are four possible cases. If JαKv = JβKv = 0 then the
expression in the bracket of the right expressions turn out to
be 0(= 0 + 0 − 0), if JαKv = 0 and JβKv = 1 then 1(=
0 + 1 − 0), if JαKv = 1 and JβKv = 0 then 1(= 1 + 0 − 0),
and if JαKv = JβKv = 1 then 1(= 1 + 1− 1). All the results
are consistent with Jα ∨ βKv .
Proposition 2. p(α = 0) = p(¬α = 1) holds, for anyα ∈ L.
In what follows, we thus replace p(α = 0) by p(¬α = 1)
and then abbreviate p(¬α = 1) to p(¬α), for all α ∈ L.
Dependency among the random variables is shown in Fig-
ure 1 using a Bayesian network, a directed acyclic graphical
model. Sentence α has a directed edge only from valuation
function V . It represents that the valuation function is the
direct cause of the truth value of the sentence. The depen-
dency between V and another sentence βi is the same as α.
Only βi is colored grey. It means that βi is assumed to be
observed, which is in contrast to the other nodes assumed to
Figure 1: Dependency between valuation function V and proposi-
tional sentences α and βi.
be predicted or estimated. The box surrounding βi is a plate.
It represents that there are N sentences β1, β2, ... and βN
to which there are directed edges from V . Given the depen-
dency, the conditional probability of α given β1, β2, ... and
βN is given as follows.
p(α|β1, β2, · · · , βN ) = p(α, β1, β2, · · · , βN )
p(β1, β2, · · · , βN )
=
∑
v p(v)p(α|v)
∏N
i=1 p(βi|v)∑
v p(v)
∏N
i=1 p(βi|v)
=
∑
v p(v)JαKvJβ1, ..., βN Kv∑
v p(v)Jβ1, ..., βN Kv =
∑
v∈Jα,β1,...,βN K p(v)∑
v∈Jβ1,...,βN K p(v)
Example 2 (Continued).
p(¬a|a ∨ ¬b,¬a ∨ b) = p(v1)
p(v1) + p(v4)
=
0.5
0.8
= 0.625
Now, we want to investigate logical properties of
p(α|β1, β2, ..., βN ). We thus define a consequence relation
between {β1, β2, ..., βN} and α.
Definition 2 (Bayesian entailment). Let α ∈ L, ∆ ⊆ L and
ω satisfy 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1. α is a Bayesian entailment of ∆ with
respect to ω, denoted by ∆ p≈ω α, if p(α|∆) ≥ ω or p(∆) =
0.
Condition p(∆) = 0 guarantees that α is a Bayesian en-
tailment of ∆ when p(α|∆) is undefined due to division by
zero. It happens when ∆ has no models, i.e., J∆K = ∅, or
zero probability, i.e., p(v) = 0, for all v ∈ J∆K. p≈ω α is a
special case of Definition 2. It holds when p(α) ≥ ω. We
call Definition 2 Bayesian entailment because p(α|∆) can be
developed as follows.
p(α|∆) =
∑
v p(α|v,∆)p(v|∆)p(∆)
p(∆)
=
∑
v
p(α|v)p(v|∆)
The last expression is often called Bayesian learning where ∆
updates the distribution over valuation functions, i.e., p(V ),
and truth values of α is predicted using the updated distri-
bution. Therefore, the Bayesian entailment allows us to see
logical consequences as machine learning predictions.
3 Correctness
3.1 Monotonic Consequence Relation
Recall that propositional entailment ∆ |= α is defined as fol-
lows: For all valuation functions v, if ∆ is true in v then α
is true in v. The Bayesian entailment p≈1 works in a similar
way as the propositional entailment. The only difference is
that the Bayesian entailment ignores valuation functions with
zero probability. The valuation functions with zero probabil-
ity represent impossible states of the world.
Theorem 1. Let α ∈ L and ∆ ⊆ L. ∆ p≈1 α holds if and
only if, for all valuation functions v such that p(v) 6= 0, if ∆
is true in v then α is true in v.
Proof. We show that ∆ 6p≈1 α holds if and only if there is a
valuation function v such that p(v) 6= 0 holds, ∆ is true in v,
and α is false in v. From Definition 2, ∆ 6p≈1 α holds if and
only if p(∆) 6= 0 and p(α|∆) 6= 1 hold. From Definition 1,
p(∆) 6= 0 holds if and only if there is a valuation function v∗
such that p(v∗) 6= 0 holds and ∆ is true in v∗. (⇐) This has
been proven so far. (⇒) p(∆) 6= 0 holds due to v∗. Since
p(α|∆) =
∑
v p(v)JαKvJ∆Kv∑
v p(v)J∆Kv 6= 1, there is v ∈ J∆K \ JαK such
that p(v) 6= 0. ∆ is true in v and α is false in v.
It is known that monotonic consequence relations can be
characterized by the three properties: Reflexivity, Monotony
and Cut. Let `⊆ Pow(L) × L. Those properties on ` are
defined as follows, where α, β ∈ L and ∆ ⊆ L.
• Reflexivity: ∀∆∀α, ∆, α ` α
• Monotony: ∀∆∀α∀β, if ∆ ` α then ∆, β ` α
• Cut: ∀∆∀α∀β, if ∆ ` β and ∆, β ` α then ∆ ` α
Reflexivity states that α is a consequence of any set with α.
Monotony states that if α is a consequence of ∆ then it is a
consequence of any superset of ∆ as well. Cut states that an
addition of any consequence of ∆ to ∆ does not reduce any
consequence of ∆. The Bayesian entailment p≈1 is monotonic
in the sense that it satisfies all of the properties.
Theorem 2. The Bayesian entailment p≈1 satisfies Reflexivity,
Monotony and Cut.
Proof. (Reflexivity) It is true because |= ⊆ p≈1 holds.
(Monotony) Since ∆ p≈1 α holds, J∆K ⊆ JαK or p(v) = 0
holds, for all v ∈ J∆K \ JαK. For all v /∈ J∆K \ JαK, it is thus
true that if v ∈ J∆K holds then v ∈ JαK. Therefore,
p(α|∆, β) = p(α,∆, β)
p(∆, β)
=
∑
v/∈J∆K\JαKJ∆KvJβKvp(v)∑
v/∈J∆K\JαKJ∆KvJβKvp(v) = 1.
Here, we have excluded all v ∈ J∆K \ JαK because of p(v) =
0. (Cut) Since ∆ p≈1 β holds, J∆K ⊆ JβK or p(v) = 0 holds,
for all v ∈ J∆K \ JβK. Since ∆, β p≈1 α holds, J∆, βK ⊆ JαK
or p(v) = 0 holds, for all v ∈ J∆, βK \ JαK. Let X = (J∆K \JβK) ∪ (J∆, βK \ JαK). For all v /∈ X , it is thus true that if
v ∈ J∆K holds then v ∈ JβK and v ∈ JαK hold. We thus have
p(α|∆, β) = p(α,∆, β)
p(∆, β)
=
∑
v/∈XJ∆Kvp(v)∑
v/∈XJ∆Kvp(v) = 1.
However, the Bayesian entailment p≈ω is not monotonic
when it is with probability ω where 0.5 < ω < 1.
Theorem 3. Let ω satisfy 0.5 < ω < 1. The Bayesian entail-
ment p≈ω satisfies Reflexivity, but does not satisfy Monotony
and Cut.
Table 2: Counter-examples of Monotony (left) and Cut (right).
p(V ) a b
v1 0 0 0
v2 1− ω 0 1
v3 1− ω 1 0
v4 2ω − 1 1 1
p(V ) a b
v1 0 0 0
v2 1− ω 0 1
v3 ω(1− ω) 1 0
v4 ω
2 1 1
Proof. (Reflexivity) Obvious from |= ⊆ p≈1 ⊆ p≈ω .
(Monotony) We show a counter-example. Given the set {a, b}
of propositional symbols, consider the probability distribu-
tion over valuation functions shown in Table 2. Note that∑
v p(v) = 1 holds. It is the case that
p(a) = p(v3) + p(v4) = (1− ω) + (2ω − 1) = ω
p(a|b) = p(v4)
p(v2) + p(v4)
=
2ω − 1
(1− ω) + (2ω − 1) =
2ω − 1
ω
.
ω > 2ω−1ω holds if and only if (ω − 1)2 > 0 holds. It is
thus always true when 0.5 < ω < 1. Therefore, p≈ω a but
b 6p≈ω a hold. (Cut) We show a counter-example. Consider
the probability distribution over valuation functions shown in
Table 2. Note that
∑
v p(v) = 1 holds. It is the case that
p(a) = p(v3) + p(v4) = ω(1− ω) + ω2 = ω
p(a ∧ b|a) = p(v4)
p(v3) + p(v4)
=
ω2
ω(1− ω) + ω2 = ω
p(a ∧ b) = p(v4) = ω2
ω > ω2 is always true when 0.5 < ω < 1. Therefore, p≈ω a
and a p≈ω a ∧ b hold, but 6p≈ω a ∧ b holds.
Example 3. Let ω = 0.8 in the left table in Table 2.
Monotony does not hold because p(a) = 0.8 and p(a|b) =
0.75 hold. Let ω = 0.8 in the right table in Table 2. Cut
does not hold because p(a) = 0.8, p(a ∧ b|a) = 0.8 and
p(a ∧ b) = 0.64 hold.
3.2 Non-monotonic Consequence Relation
It is known that there are at least four core properties char-
acterizing non-monotonic consequence relations: Supraclas-
sicality, Reflexivity, Cautious monotony and Cut. Let p∼⊆
Pow(L) × L be a consequence relation on L. They are for-
mally defined as follows, where α, β ∈ L and ∆ ⊆ L.
• Supraclassicality: ∀∆∀α, if ∆ ` α then ∆ p∼ α
• Reflexivity: ∀∆∀α, ∆, α p∼ α
• Cautious monotony: ∀∆∀α∀β, if ∆ p∼ β and ∆ p∼ α
then ∆, β p∼ α
• Cut: ∀∆∀α∀β, if ∆ p∼ β and ∆, β p∼ α then ∆ p∼ α
We have already discussed reflexivity and cut. Supraclassi-
cality states that the consequence relation extends the mono-
tonic consequence relation. Cautious monotony states that if
α is a consequence of ∆ then it is a consequence of supersets
of ∆ as well. However, it is weaker than monotony because
the supersets are restricted to consequences of ∆. Conse-
quence relations satisfying those properties are often called a
cumulative consequence relation [Brewka et al., 1997].1
Theorem 4. Let ω satisfy 0.5 < ω < 1. The Bayesian entail-
ment p≈ω satisfies Supraclassicality and Reflexivity, but does
not satisfy Cautious monotony and Cut.
Proof. (Reflexivity & Cut) See Theorem 3. (Supraclassical-
ity) This is obvious from |= ⊆ p≈ω . (Cautious monotony) It
is enough to show a counter-example. Given set {a, b} of
atomic propositions, consider again the distribution over val-
uation functions shown in the left table in Table 2. We have
p(a) = p(v3) + p(v4) = (1− ω) + (2ω − 1) = ω
p(b) = p(v2) + p(v4) = (1− ω) + (2ω − 1) = ω
p(a|b) = p(v4)
p(v2) + p(v4)
=
2ω − 1
ω
.
ω ≤ 2ω−1ω holds if and only if (ω − 1)2 ≤ 0 holds. It is
always false when 0.5 < ω < 1 holds.
Theorem 4 shows that, in general, the Bayesian entail-
ment p≈ω is not cumulative. A natural criticism against
the Bayesian entailment is that it is inadequate as a non-
monotonic consequence relation due to the lack of Cautious
monotony and Cut. Indeed, Gabbay [Gabbay, 1985] consid-
ers, on the basis of his intuition, that non-monotonic conse-
quence relations satisfy at least Cautious monotony, Reflex-
ivity and Cut. However, it is controversial because of unin-
tuitive behavior of Cautious monotony and Cut in extreme
cases. A consequence relation p∼ with Cut, for instance, sat-
isfies p∼ xN+1 when it satisfies p∼ x1 and xi p∼ xi+1, for
all i(1 ≤ i ≤ N). This is very unintuitive when N is large.
Brewka [Brewka et al., 1997] in fact points out the infinite
transitivity as a weakness of Cut.
3.3 Preferential Entailment
The preferential entailment [Shoham, 1987] is a well-known
approach to a non-monotonic consequence relation. It is de-
fined on a preferential structure (V,), where V is a set of
valuation functions and  is an irreflexive and transitive re-
lation on V . v1  v2 represents that v1 is preferable2 to v2
in the sense that the world identified by v1 is more normal,
typical or natural than the one identified by v2. Given a pref-
erential structure (V,), α is a preferential entailment of ∆,
denoted by ∆ p∼(V,) α, if α is true in all -maximal3 mod-
els of ∆.
Now, we introduce several concepts to show the relation-
ship between the preferential entailment and the Bayesian en-
tailment. vMAP is said to be a maximum a posteriori (MAP)
estimate if it satisfies
vMAP = arg max
v
p(v|∆).
1This definition is not absolute. The authors [Kraus et al., 1990]
define it as a relation satisfying Reflexivity, Left logical equivalence,
Right weakening, Cut and Cautious monotony.
2For the sake of simplicity, we do not adopt the common practice
in logic that v2  v1 denotes v1 is preferable to v2.
3 has to be smooth (or stuttered) [Kraus et al., 1990] so that a
maximal model certainly exists.
Figure 2: The left table shows the distribution over valuation func-
tions. The right graph shows the order-preserving probability mass
function that maps each valuation function to its probability.
It is known that Bayesian estimation coincides with maxi-
mum a posteriori estimation under the assumption that the
probability distribution p(V |∆) has a unique peak close to 1
at a valuation function. It means that there is a single state
of the world that is very normal, natural or typical. Under
the assumption, we have p(V |∆) ' 1 if V = vMAP and 0
otherwise, where ' denotes an approximation. We now have
p(α|∆) =
∑
v
p(α|v)p(v|∆) ' p(α|vMAP ).
p(α|vMAP ) ∈ {0, 1} holds. We thus define a maximum a
posteriori entailment as follows.
Definition 3 (Maximum a posteriori entailment). Let α ∈ L
and ∆ ⊆ L. α is a maximum a posteriori entailment of ∆,
denoted by ∆ p≈MAP α, if p(α|vMAP ) = 1 or p(∆) = 0,
where vMAP = arg maxv p(v|∆).
Given two ordered sets (S1,≤1) and (S2,≤2), a function f
is said to be an order-preserving (or isotone) map of (S1,≤1)
into (S2,≤2) if x ≤1 y implies that f(x) ≤2 f(y), for all
x, y ∈ S1. The next theorem relates the maximum a posteri-
ori entailment to the preferential entailment.
Theorem 5. Let (V,) be a preferential structure and p :
V → [0, 1] be a probability mass function over V . If p
is an order-preserving map of (V,) into ([0, 1],≥) then
∆ p∼(V,) α implies ∆ p≈MAP α.
Proof. It is obviously true when ∆ has no model. Let v∗ be a
-maximal model of ∆. It is sufficient to show p(α|v∗) = 1
and v∗ = arg maxv p(v|∆). Since ∆ p∼(V,) α, α is true in
v∗. Thus, p(α|v∗) = JαKv∗ = 1. We have
arg max
v
p(v|∆) = arg max
v
p(∆|v)p(v) = arg max
v
J∆Kvp(v)
Since ∆ is true in v∗, J∆Kv∗ = 1. Since p is order-
preserving, if v1  v2 then p(v1) ≥ p(v2), for all v1, v2.
Thus, if v is -maximal then p(v) is maximal. Therefore,
v∗ = arg maxvJ∆Kvp(v) holds.
Example 4. Suppose the probability distribution over valua-
tion functions shown in the table in Figure 2 and the prefer-
ential structure ({v1, v2, v3, v4}, {(v1, v2), (v1, v3), (v1, v4),
(v3, v2), (v4, v2)}).The transitivity of  is depicted in the
graph shown in Figure 2. As shown in the graph, the prob-
ability mass function p is an order-preserving map of (V,)
into ([0, 1],≥).
Figure 3: Hidden Markov model for an extended functionality of the
Bayesian entailment.
Now, {a ∨ ¬b} p∼(V,) ¬b holds because ¬b is true in all
-maximal models of {a ∨ ¬b}, i.e., v1. Meanwhile, {a ∨
¬b} p≈MAP ¬b holds because p(¬b|v1) = 1 holds where
v1 = arg maxv p(v|a ∨ ¬b). However, {a} 6p∼(V,) ¬b holds
because ¬b is false in a -maximal model of a ∨ ¬b, i.e.,
v4. In contrast, {a} p≈MAP ¬b holds because p(¬b|v3) = 1
holds where v3 = arg maxv p(v|a).
The equivalence relation between the maximum a posteri-
ori entailment and the preferential entailment is obtained by
restricting the preferential structure to a total order.
Theorem 6. Let (V,) be a totally-ordered preferential
structure and p : V → [0, 1] be a probability mass func-
tion over V . If p is an order-preserving map of (V,) into
([0, 1],≥) then ∆ p∼(V,) α if and only if ∆ p≈MAP α.
Proof. Same as Theorem 5. The only difference is that such
model v∗ exists uniquely.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
There are a lot of attempts to combine logic and proba-
bility theory, e.g., [Adams, 1998; van Fraassen, 1981; van
Fraassen, 1983; Morgan, 1983; Cross, 1993; Leblanc, 1979;
Leblanc and Morgan, 1983; Pearl, 1991; Goosens, 1979;
Richardson and Domingos, 2006; Thimm, 2013]. Their com-
mon interest is not the notion of truth preservation but rather
probability preservation, where the uncertainty of the conclu-
sion preserves the uncertainty of the premises. They are dif-
ferent from ours as they presuppose and extend the classical
logical consequence.
Besides the preferential entailment, various other seman-
tics for non-monotonic consequence relations have been pro-
posed such as plausibility structure [Friedman and Halpern,
1996], possibility structure [Dubois and Prade, 1990; Ben-
ferhat et al., 2003], ranking structure [Goldszmidt and Pearl,
1992] and ε-semantics [Adams, 1975; Pearl, 1989]. The com-
mon idea of the first three approaches is that ∆ entails α ifJ∆∧αK  J∆∧¬αK holds given preference relation. How-
ever, the difficulty associated with determining the preference
is discussed by Brewka [Brewka et al., 1997] as follows: Per-
haps, the greatest technical challenge left for circumscrip-
tion and model preference theories in general is how to en-
code preferences among abnormalities or defaults. Given
a default d, we think that its preference can be defined by∑
v∈JdK p(v|∆), i.e., the sum of the posterior probabilities of
the models in which the default is true. The benefit of this ap-
proach is that the preferences among defaults can be dynam-
ically encoded and updated within probabilistic inference in
accordance with observation ∆. The idea of ε-semantics is
that ∆ entails α if p(α|∆) is close to one given a probabilis-
tic knowledge base that quantifies the strength of the causal
relation or dependency between sentences. It differs from
our basic idea, depicted in Figure 1, that any sentences are
conditionally independent given a model. This fact enables
us to mathematically handle interactions between models and
sentences within probabilistic inference. It is different from
the approaches [Adams, 1975; Pearl, 1989; Hawthorne, 2007;
Hawthorne and Makinson, 2007] handling the interactions
outside their probabilistic inference.
A natural criticism against our work is that the Bayesian
entailment is inadequate as a non-monotonic consequence re-
lation due to the lack of Cautious monotony and Cut. How-
ever, we showed that the preferential entailment satisfying
Cautious monotony and Cut is shown to correspond to the
maximum a posteriori entailment that is an approximation of
the Bayesian entailment. It tells us that Cautious monotony
and Cut are ideal under the special condition that a state of
the world exists deterministically. They are not ideal under
the general perspective that states of the world are probabilis-
tically distributed.
The Bayesian entailment is flexible to extend. For exam-
ple, a possible extension of Figure 1 is a hidden Markov
model shown in Figure 3. It has a valuation variable and a
sentence(s) variable, for each time step t where 1 ≤ t ≤
N . Entailment ∆1, ...,∆N p≈ω αN defined in accordance
with Definition 2 concludes αN by taking into account not
only the current observation ∆N but also the previous states
of the world VN−1 updated by all of the past observations
∆1, ...,∆N−1. It is especially useful when observations are
contradictory, ambiguous or easy to change.
Our hypothesis is that the Bayesian entailment can be a
mathematical model of how human brains implement an en-
tailment. It is supported by the three reasons. First, as shown
in Section 2, it is built on a very simple probabilistic model
based on Bayes’ Theorem. Second, as discussed in Section 3,
it has general properties as a monotonic and a non-monotonic
consequence relation. Third, growing evidences for the
Bayesian brain hypothesis are emerging from the studies of
artificial intelligence and neuroscience today [Friston, 2012;
Sanborn and Chater, 2016]. We understand that our hypothe-
sis is a subject to a scientific experiment. However, we think
that this paper provides evidences, in terms of logic, sufficient
to establish the hypothesis.
In this paper, we gave a Bayesian account of entailment and
characterized its abstract inferential properties. The Bayesian
entailment was shown to be a monotonic consequence re-
lation in an extreme case. In general, it is a sort of non-
monotonic consequence relation without Cautious monotony
or Cut. The preferential entailment was shown to be a max-
imum a posteriori entailment, which is an approximation
of the Bayesian entailment. We finally discussed merits of
our proposals for encoding preferences on defaults, handling
change and contradiction, and modeling human entailment.
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